and federalization—narrated as the means and ends of integration. That is, liberalization for the purposes of European organization, marketization for greater federalization. Many of today’s European leaders and mass publics lament the markerization that “globalization” has putatively imposed on them. Jabko’s insightful argument turns these lamentations on their head, for it is clear that if EU members find themselves hemmed in by liberal rules and practices, they should also recognize that the liberalism is of their own making. The fact that the strategic, not principled, liberalism of the project now undermines public support for further integration is one of the most fascinating paradoxes that Jabko cleverly resolves.

**Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics.** By Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 345p. $35.00. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072714

— William A. Boettcher III, North Carolina State University

One inevitable result of the recent U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq has been renewed scholarly interest in the determinants of wartime public opinion. In a recent influential article, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler (“Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” *International Security,* 30 [Winter 2005/6]: 7–46) argue that casualty tolerance is primarily shaped by prospective beliefs about likely success and retrospective judgments regarding the “rightness” of the decision to initiate the conflict. This rationalist account of wartime public opinion suggests that the mass public will accept the costs of war if they are exceeded by attainable and important benefits.

In *Failing to Win,* Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney illuminate the limitations of the rationalist model of “score-keeping” that seeks to relate perceptions of victory and defeat to objectively observable material gains and losses on the battlefield. They cite a number of familiar cases in international politics (the Mayaguez, Somalia, Tet, the War of 1812, etc.) where perceptions of winners and losers were instead shaped by psychological, political, and cultural factors. The authors portray states and/or decision makers as victims of “match-fixing” (a term borrowed from sports, pp. 38–39) as mind-sets, salient events, and societal pressures distort reality and produce apparent victors despite ambiguous outcomes or, even worse, turn clear winners on the battlefield into losers in the court of public opinion. Where other researchers attempt to measure individual perceptions of prospective success or elicit the metrics that form the foundation for these beliefs, Johnson and Tierney offer a comprehensive model of the process that yields these judgments. In doing so, they construct a bridge between the rationalist (score-keeping) camp and those scholars that emphasize the importance of political and/or psychological biases (match-fixing).

The book begins with the construction of the score-keeping and match-fixing frameworks. The authors emphasize that although score-keeping serves as the null hypothesis throughout the book, they accept the normative strength of this framework and “argue later that score-keeping is the way people should judge victory and defeat” (p. 24, emphasis in original). Score-keeping involves an accounting of the material gains and aims of each side in a conflict (the authors eschew counterfactual analyses to evaluate policy optimality, pp. 28–29). Both gains (and losses) and aims are then weighted for importance and difficulty (see Chart 2.2, p. 27). The match-fixing framework offers a descriptively valid alternative that supplements the rationalist model. Mind-sets, salient events, and societal pressures subjectively bias both the metrics chosen to evaluate policy and the processing of information pertinent to those metrics (altering access, selection, and recall and occasionally producing distortion, pp. 44–45). The authors argue that both score-keeping and match-fixing occur (sometimes varying among observers of the same case), but note that the decisiveness and clarity of some outcomes favor score-keeping (e.g., World War II). They also suggest that observers tend to match-fix against the more powerful side in a conflict and that democratic publics tend to score-keep others but match-fix against themselves (p. 78). The complete explanatory model (Chart 4.1, p. 78) depicts the conditional nature of score-keeping and match-fixing in forming perceptions of victory and defeat.

The remainder of the book is composed of case studies (of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Tet Offensive, Yom Kippur War, U.S. intervention in Somalia, and current U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq) and a concluding chapter offering advice for observers, international leaders, and U.S. policymakers. In each case study, the authors first provide a score-keeping analysis of the outcomes for the relevant actors that inevitably fails to predict the predominant postconflict perceptions of success and failure. They then embark on constructing a match-fixing explanation that more accurately reflects the counterintuitive judgments (at least from the rationalist perspective) of contemporary observers. An important footnote (n. 8, pp. 309–10) describes the process used to select the cases. Each case was chosen due to an a priori belief that the score-keeping framework failed to fully explain judgments about the outcomes for relevant actors. Since these cases also served as inductive referents in theory construction, they “are not meant to be a scientific test” of the authors’ predictions (n. 8, p. 309). Instead, the cases may be viewed as plausibility probes of the match-fixing framework and broader comprehensive model.

As with any book of such expansive scope and interdisciplinary character, *Failing to Win* is vulnerable to critique from a number of perspectives. The authors’ profession that the score-keeping framework is not a “straw man” argument (p. 24) may ring false for adherents of the rationalist...
model. After cataloguing the many match-fixing biases that humans are known to possess, the authors conclude that “[n]one of this makes Framework 1, score-keeping, a realistic model for explaining human evaluations much of the time. . . .” These predisposing factors often fix the match so that one side is bound to win, almost irrespective of its gains or losses on the ground” (pp. 48–49). This sentiment, combined with the stripped-down nature of the authors’ score-keeping model and the case-selection criteria, suggests that they may be engaging in some match-fixing of their own. Conversely, political psychologists will question their stubborn attachment to score-keeping as a normative model. The frequent use of the terms “bias” and “manipulation” and the notion that leaders and states are “victims” of match-fixing perpetuates the notion that these are departures from rationality, rather than simply fundamental human behaviors. Finally, historians will find little new in the case studies as the authors rely primarily on secondary sources and emphasize breadth over depth (given the number of frameworks, variables, and actors).

Despite its limitations, the book is an ambitious and novel contribution to the burgeoning literature on the determinants of wartime public opinion. Its foremost strengths are the comprehensiveness of the overall model, the authors’ willingness to acknowledge the underlying multidimensionality and complexity of the process of judgment, and the attempt to bridge the divide between the dominant camps in the ongoing debate. It will be of interest to scholars across a range of disciplines and should be required reading for leaders and policymakers who must shape opinion at home and abroad or risk snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

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The various authors in this book are activists and scholars associated, in one way or another, with the Human Rights Caucus of the World Summit on the Information Society held in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005). They share a “firm commitment to promoting human rights standards as an essential baseline for the assessment and governance of the GIS [global information society]” (p. 7). To that end, the book analyzes how the development of public policy on GIS issues affects the protection and promotion of human rights. How are rights like freedom of expression, to privacy, to freedom from discrimination, and women’s rights affected by the rapid spread of the GIS? As the book’s introduction suggests, “there is a pressing need to think through how these rights apply in a globally networked and information-intensive world, identify specific policies and practices that could be contrary to their preservation and promotion, and suggest specific reforms that would rectify such problems” (p. 26).

This approach has not, the book avers, been undertaken in any systematic way before. By doing so, the authors suggest, we will better understand how changes in information and communications technology (ICT) impact on the global human rights regime. This promises, prima facie, to be of value for lawyers and activists working on these issues but, despite passing reference in the introduction’s bibliography to works on “legalization”—Kenneth W. Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization,” in Judith Goldstein et al., eds., Legalization and World Politics, a special issue of International Organization 54 (Summer 2000): 401–19—and “epistemic communities”—Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, a special issue of International Organization 45, (Winter 1992)—there is no concerted attempt to view the issues under discussion through the theoretical apparatus these ideas provide. This limits the value of such a work to political scientists, as does the lack of any sustained attention to the politics of global regulatory regimes (on which more as follows).

In the various chapters, prominent rights are enumerated and assessed in the context of changes in information availability and ownership, enhanced state surveillance, intellectual property rights regulation, monitoring and censorship of Internet material, the organization of resistance to state oppression, and more. While the book has no overall conclusion, almost every chapter points to both the liberatory potential of the GIS and the concomitant risks of more extensive intrusion into our lives. Its contributors combine this observation of the trade-offs that the GIS poses with an awareness of the impact of the so-called digital divide on access to hi-tech sources of knowledge and communication in areas of the developing world.

Human Rights in the Global Information Society provides fairly thorough critical analyses of the implications that various responses to changes in GIS policy pose for human rights, even if it can be a touch credulous about how much even Western state officials actually care about the public interest dimension of that policy. No one, or rather no one not on the payroll of a multinational corporation, or in the intelligence and security services of the state, could read the accounts by Robin Gross (chap. 4) on intellectual property rights, by Gus Hosein (pp. 135–40) on biometrics, by Charley Lewis (pp. 171–74) on e-mail snooping, and by Meryem Marzouki (pp. 204–13) on police and corporate power without feeling a little unnerved. Lewis (pp. 152–53), and Kay Raseroka (chap. 5) give us more encouraging news of the way technology and information services can aid political resistance and social inclusion. The book therefore works best when we get focused discussion with some empirical content (the chapters by Gross and Marzouki being perhaps the strongest).